"
Via Simon Johnson and Peter Boone - Originally posted at VoxEU,
(Via CentrePiece
magazine)
There is a common problem underlying the economic troubles of Europe, Japan,
and the US: the symbiotic relationship between politicians who heed narrow
interests and the growth of a financial sector that has become increasingly
opaque (
Igan and Mishra 2011). Bailouts have encouraged reckless
behaviour in the financial sector, which builds up further risks – and will lead
to another round of shocks, collapses, and bailouts.
This is what we have called the ‘doomsday cycle’ (Boone and Johnson 2010).
The cycle turned in 2007-8 and was most dramatically manifest in the weeks and
months that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers, the collapse of Iceland’s
banks and the botched ‘rescue’ of the big three Irish financial
institutions.
The consequences have included sovereign debt restructuring by Greece, as
well as continuing problems – and lending programmes by the IMF and the EU – for
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Italy, Spain and other parts of the Eurozone
remain under intense pressure.
Yet in some circles, there is a sense that the countries of the Eurozone have
put the worst of their problems behind them. Following a string of summits, it
is argued, Europe is now more decisively on the path to a unified financial
system backed by what will become the substance of a fiscal union.
The doomsday cycle is indeed turning – and problems are undoubtedly heading
towards Japan and the US: the current level of complacency among policymakers in
those countries is alarming. But the next turn of the global cycle looks likely
to hit Europe again and probably harder than before.
The continental European
financial system is in big trouble: budgets are unsustainable and growth is
nowhere on the horizon. The costs of bailouts are rising – and the coming scale
of the problem is likely to undermine political support for the Eurozone
itself.
The structure of the doomsday cycle
In the 1980s and 1990s, deep economic crises occurred primarily in middle-
and low-income countries that were too small to have direct global effects. The
crises we should fear today are in relatively rich countries that are big enough
to reduce growth around the world.
The problem is that the modern financial infrastructure makes it possible to
borrow a great deal relative to the size of an economy – and far more than is
sustainable relative to growth prospects. The expectation of bailouts has become
built into the system, in terms of government and central bank support. But this
expectation is also faulty because, at times, the claims on the system are more
than can ultimately be paid.
- For politicians, this is a great opportunity.
It enables them to buy favour and win re-election. The problems will become
apparent, they calculate, on someone else’s watch. So repeated bailouts have
become the expectation not the exception.
- For bankers and financiers of all kinds, this is easy money and great
fortune – literally.
The complexity and scale of modern finance make it easy to hide what is going
on. The regulated financial sector has little interest in speaking truth to
authority; that would just undercut their business. Banks that are ‘too big to
fail’ benefit from giant, hidden and very dangerous government subsidies. Yet
despite repeated failures, many top officials pretend that ‘the market’ or
‘smart regulators’ can take care of this problem.
- For the broader public, none of this is clear – until it is too
late.
The issues are abstract and lack the personal drama that grabs headlines. The
policy community does not understand the issues or becomes complicit in the
schemes of politicians and big banks. The true costs of bailouts are disguised
and not broadly understood. Millions of jobs are lost, lives ruined, fiscal
balance sheets damaged – and for what, exactly?
Over the past four centuries, financial development has strongly supported
economic development. The market-based creation of new institutions and products
encouraged savings by a broad cross-section of society, allowing capital to flow
into more productive uses. But in recent decades, parts of our financial
development have gone badly off-track – becoming much more a ‘rent-seeking’
mechanism that draws support from politicians because it facilitates
irresponsible public policy.
- The question is: Who will be hurt next by this structure?
There are three prominent candidates: Japan, the US, and the Eurozone..."
at
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2012-09-22/whats-next-simon-johnson-explains-doomsday-cycle