Showing posts with label crash. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crash. Show all posts

Monday, March 19, 2012

HUSSMAN: The Market Looks Exactly Like It Did Before The Last Crash

"In his latest weekly note, fund manager John Hussman is... bearish on the market.
This has been his stance for a couple years now, and this week he looks at a technical indicator showing signs of excessive optimism:
As of Friday, the S&P 500 was within 1% of its upper Bollinger band at virtually every horizon, including daily, weekly and monthly bands. The last time the S&P 500 reached a similar extreme was Friday April 29, 2011, when I titled the following Monday's comment Extreme Conditions and Typical Outcomes . I observed when the market has previously been overbought to this extent, coupled with more general features of an "overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising yields syndrome", the average outcome has been particularly hostile:
"Examining this set of instances, it's clear that overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yields syndromes as extreme as we observe today are even more important for their extended implications than they are for market prospects over say, 3-6 months. Though there is a tendency toward abrupt market plunges, the initial market losses in 1972 and 2007 were recovered over a period of several months before second signal emerged, followed by a major market decline. Despite the variability in short-term outcomes, and even the tendency for the market to advance by several percent after the syndrome emerges, the overall implications are clearly negative on the basis of average return/risk outcomes."
As it happened, April 29, 2011 turned out to mark the exact high of the S&P 500 for the year, and was followed by a steep intermediate market plunge. My impression is that despite the recent run of speculation the market has enjoyed - largely reflecting a reprieve in European debt concerns and what appears to be a drawing-forward of jobs into the first quarter due to unseasonably favorable weather - the extended implications of present market conditions remain decidedly negative..."

at http://www.businessinsider.com/hussman-the-market-is-now-exactly-like-the-last-time-the-market-crashed-2012-3#ixzz1pZnFVihH

Saturday, June 12, 2010

What Makes Deflation Likely Today?

"Bob Prechter, Deflation Survival Guide, free Club EWI eBook
Following the Great Depression, the Fed and the U.S. government embarked on a program...both of increasing the creation of new money and credit and of fostering the confidence of lenders and borrowers so as to facilitate the expansion of credit. These policies both accommodated and encouraged the expansionary trend of the ’Teens and 1920s, which ended in bust, and the far larger expansionary trend that began in 1932 and which has accelerated over the past half-century. Other governments and central banks have followed similar policies. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and similar institutions, funded mostly by the U.S. taxpayer, have extended immense credit around the globe.

Their policies have supported nearly continuous worldwide inflation, particularly over the past thirty years. As a result, the global financial system is gorged with non-self-liquidating credit. Conventional economists excuse and praise this system under the erroneous belief that expanding money and credit promotes economic growth, which is terribly false. It appears to do so for a while, but in the long run, the swollen mass of debt collapses of its own weight, which is deflation, and destroys the economy. A devastated economy, moreover, encourages radical politics, which is even worse.

The value of credit that has been extended worldwide is unprecedented. Worse, most of this debt is the non-self-liquidating type. Much of it comprises loans to governments, investment loans for buying stock and real estate, and loans for everyday consumer items and services, none of which has any production tied to it. Even a lot of corporate debt is non-self-liquidating, since so much of corporate activity these days is related to finance rather than production.



Figure 11-5 is a stunning picture of the credit expansion of wave V of the 1920s (beginning the year that Congress authorized the Fed), which ended in a bust, and of wave V in the 1980s-1990s, which is even bigger.

...it has been the biggest credit expansion in history by a huge margin. Coextensively, not only is there a threat of deflation, but there is also the threat of the biggest deflation in history by a huge margin. ..."

at http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article20231.html